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In December 1953, a federal jury acquitted Alfonse Bartkus of robbing a
federally insured bank. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause barred reprosec-
ution of Bartkus in federal courts, the disappointed federal authorities instigated
reprosecution of Bartkus by Illinois authorities under a state robbery statute.
But the federal authorities did even more. They prepared the state case, guided
the state prosecution, and postponed the sentencing of Bartkus' alleged co-
perpetrators until they testified against Bartkus at the state trial.' In January
1954, Bartkus was tried in state court on substantially the same facts. This time,
he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.2
The Supreme Court affirmed Bartkus' conviction on two grounds: (1) the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states;3 and (2) even if the Double
Jeopardy Clause were to apply to the states, offenses against different sover-
eigns are not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes In 1969, the
Court applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states, eviscerating the first
ground for the decision in Bartkus After 1969, cases following Bartkus relied
solely on the second ground, the dual sovereignty doctrine. This doctrine alone
1. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 169 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. 359 U.S. at 164-68 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
3. 359 U.S. at 124.
4. 359 U.S. at 128-29.
5. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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justifies reprosecution by state authorities of defendants tried before federal
courts,7 reprosecution by federal authorities of defendants tried before state
courts,8 and reprosecution by state authorities of defendants tried before the
courts of another state.9
This Note makes a new argument against the dual sovereignty doctrine. 0
It argues that the doctrine is unconstitutional because it violates the principle
of popular sovereignty underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Note
contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be understood not only as a
protection afforded criminal defendants, but as a structural provision implement-
ing the principle of popular sovereignty. This structural aspect of the Double
Jeopardy Clause renders the dual sovereignty doctrine unconstitutional because
it denigrates the power of the jury as well as the rights of criminal defendants.
In short, this Note argues that the reprosecution of Alfonse Bartkus undermined
the sovereignty of the people. In Bartkus, the people had spoken, acquitting the
defendant, and exercising their ultimate check on government authority. The
dual sovereignty doctrine allowed government to ignore this verdict, reprosecute
Alfonse Bartkus, and undermine the sovereignty of the people.
I. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed,
it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people that we must
begin. b-Alexis de Tocqueville"
The power of the people lies at the foundation of American government.
12
In the United States, government derives its authority "from the consent of the
governed"'13 and maintains its legitimacy through the participation of the
7. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121 (1959) (permitting state prosecution for robbery following federal
prosecution for robbery of federally insured bank).
8. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (permitting federal prosecution for conspiracy to
destroy federal communications facilities following state prosecution for conspiracy to destroy property of
another).
9. Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (permitting state prosecution for murder following murder prosecution by another
state).
10. The unconstitutionality of the dual sovereignty doctrine is not, in itself, a novel claim. See generally
Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CI. L. REV.
591 (1961); Harlan R. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human
Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306 (1963); Dominic T. Holzhaus, Double Jeopardy and Incremental
Culpability: A Unitary Alternative to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1986);
Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 383 (1986); George C. Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, 14 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 700 (1963); Lawrence Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecution, 34
S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1961).
11. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
12. See generally Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1429-66 (1987)
(discussing the principle of popular sovereignty).
13. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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people in a representative democracy.14 Although the people delegate authority
and confer legitimacy, they retain sovereignty. 15 As sovereign, the people
possess the final check on government authority.
16
When we translate the principle of popular sovereignty from political
rhetoric into a legal idea, the distinctions between delegating, legitimating, and
supervising government authority become important. While all three relate to
the power of the people, only the third-supervising--constitutes an exercise
of popular sovereignty, strictly speaking. While delegating authority is essential
to constituting a government, until a government is constituted the people have
nothing over which to exercise their sovereignty. And while legitimating
government authority through representative democracy is also important, this
action entails participating in government rather than exercising control over
it. Only by asserting their supervisory powers over government do the people
exercise their sovereignty.
It is important to understand two related aspects of this supervisory power:
(1) an exercise of popular sovereignty must take place from without the struc-
ture of government; and (2) an exercise of popular sovereignty must be final
and unappealable.
First, an exercise of popular sovereignty must be "supra-legal." Popular
sovereignty cannot take place from within the structure of government, for to
confine exercises of popular sovereignty to a place or role within the govern-
ment would subject the popular will to government processes, regulation, and
even control.17 Because the popular will cannot be regulated and remain
sovereign, an exercise of popular sovereignty must be "supra-legal."
Historically, the American people have demonstrated this "supra-legal"
aspect of popular sovereignty through revolution, constitutional convention, and
jury nullification. In revolution and convention, the people exercised their
"right... to alter or abolish" any form of government destructive of their
inalienable rights.18 The American Revolution occurred from outside the
structure of the British Empire: to exercise their right to abolish the govern-
ment, the colonists found it necessary first to declare independence from British
authority and to "dissolve the political bands which have connected them with
another [people]." 19 The constitutional convention also occurred from outside
the governmental structure: to exercise their right to alter or abolish an ineffec-
14. See PAUL A. DAWSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES, AND PoLTmcs 31-32
(1987) (discussing legitimating function of participatory democracy).
15. See Amar, supra note 12, at 1437 (discussing distinction in American political thought between
authority and sovereignty).
16. Government authority is controlled in the first instance by a system of "checks and balances" within
the government. We should not forget, however, the existence of a final check on government authority
possessed by the people.
17. Popular sovereignty should not be confused with populist reform, which takes place through, if
not within, existing structures of government.
18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
19. Id. at para. 1.
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tual government, the Framers found it necessary to ignore the requirement in
the Articles of Confederation that any amendment be approved by all of the
state legislatures. 21 Jury nullification, too, is supra-legal: most jurisdictions
refuse to instruct the jury that they have this authority.21 The jury must itself
determine that it possesses such power. Furthermore, this determination and the
decision to exercise it quite literally occur outside the structure of govern-
ment-that is, outside the courtroom in the jury room, from which the govern-
ment is excluded.
The exercise of popular sovereignty must also be final and unappealable.
In the words of James Wilson, "In all governments, whatever is their form,
however they may be constituted, there must be a power established from which
there is no appeal . . . . The only question is where that power is
lodged? ... [I]t remains and flourishes with the people." 22 The final and unap-
pealable aspect of popular sovereignty follows from the requirement that an
exercise of popular sovereignty occur from without the structure of government.
Once appeal is permitted, the following questions arise: Who may appeal?
Before whom? How many times? Who may limit appeals? It is impossible to
answer these questions without subjecting the popular will to government
authority. Because an exercise of popular sovereignty must occur from without
the ambit of government authority, such an exercise must be final and unappeal-
able.
II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.23
The Double Jeopardy Clause has a distinguished pedigree. It is "the oldest
of all the Bill of Rights guarantees,"' recognized in one form or another by
"all the cultures from which we draw our moral and legal precepts."5 Con-
20. See Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
Cmi. L. REV. 1043, 1047-56 (1988) (discussing process of ratification outside of Article V and analogous
provisions of state constitutions); cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 173-75 (1991)
(discussing "illegality" of Constitutional Convention).
21. See United States v. Dougherty, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
22. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 530 (1969) (quoting JAMES
WILSON, PENNsYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTTTION, 1787-88 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick
Dawson Stone eds., 1888)).
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
24. See George C. Thomas, IlI, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL L. REV. 827,
828.
25. Id.; see generally Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81; Comment, Twice in Jeopardy 75 YALE LJ. 262 (1963).
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cepts similar to the Double Jeopardy Clause may be found in the law of
Athens,26 the law of the Roman Republics, 27 the Digest of Justinian,2 early
canon law, 29 English common law,30 and early American colonial law.
31
A distinguished pedigree can inhibit thought, however, tempting scholars
to synthesize millennia of double jeopardy jurisprudence into a simple rubric.
An example of a work that attempts this synthesis is Twice in Jeopardy.32
Appearing in 1963 as the Warren Court was reaching its "apogee, 3 3 this
student comment synthesized double jeopardy jurisprudence into a framework
grounded in individual rights. In so doing, Twice in Jeopardy organized the
whole of Double Jeopardy jurisprudence around three rules: "the rules which
bar retrial for the same offense after acquittal, retrial for the same offense after
conviction, and multiple punishment for the same offense at one trial.' 34
Twice in Jeopardy has influenced thinking about the Double Jeopardy
Clause by courts35 and commentators36 for decades. Its rules-oriented app-
roach proved highly compatible with the individual rights-oriented jurisprudence
of the Warren Court. Yet Twice in Jeopardy regards the Double Jeopardy
Clause as merely the modem version of an ancient legal precept. It ignores the
distinctly American innovations imparted to the precept when it was incorporat-
ed into the United States Constitution. Because the work falls to evaluate the
Double Jeopardy Clause as an integral part of the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution, Twice in Jeopardy fails to appreciate the structural purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, it reduces double jeopardy jurisprudence
to nothing more than a menu of procedural safeguards afforded criminal defen-
dants.
A second seminal work moved beyond the rules-oriented approach of Twice
in Jeopardy to examine the interests underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause
but, like Twice in Jeopardy, failed to appreciate fully the structural role of the
26. Thomas, supra note 24, at 836 (citing JOHN WALKER JONES, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE
GREEKS 148 (1956)).
27. JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2-3
(1969); J. MS LEIGH STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, PROBLEIS OF THE ROMAN CRIMINAL LAW 155 (1912).
28. DIG. 48.2.7.2 (Ulpian, Officio Proconsulis 7).
29. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.4 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing "canon law
opposition to double trials" manifest, inter alia, in the maxim "Not even God judges twice for the same
act").
30. See 4 WILLtAmi BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *328-29.
31. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 153 n.7 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing American colonial law prohibiting
double jeopardy).
32. 7W ice in Jeopardy, supra note 25.
33. Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1117 (1991).
34. Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 25, at 265-66 (citations omitted). Under narrowly prescribed
circumstances, a fourth rule bars retrial following a mistrial. Id. at 266.
35. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 n.8 (1969) (citing Twice in Jeopardy in
opinion holding that Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar imposition of heavier sentence upon reprosecution
following erroneous conviction).
36. See, e.g., Thomas supra note 24 (presenting Twice in Jeopardy as one of three dominant paradigms
in Double Jeopardy jurisprudence).
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Clause. In Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy,37 Peter Westen and
Richard Drubel argued that "the principle of double jeopardy serves three
interests. In ascending degrees of importance, they are: (1) an interest in fin-
ality... (2) an interest in avoiding double punishment... and (3) an interest
in protecting nullification-viz., an interest in allowing the system to acquit
against the evidence... . 8 Under their analysis, the Double Jeopardy Clause
was no longer reduced to a mere menu of procedural safeguards afforded
criminal defendants. Indeed, Westen and Drubel downplayed the individual
rights aspect of the Clause: though the interest in finality is based largely in
a concern for the rights of criminal defendants, 39 Westen and Drubel argue
that finality is a weak value, "insufficient, by itself, to explain results reached
in double jeopardy cases. ' 4 In addition, Westen and Drubel developed two
structural aspects of the Double Jeopardy Clause: (1) subjecting prosecutors to
constraints imposed by legislatures; and (2) subjecting prosecutors to constraints
imposed by juries.
The interest in avoiding double punishment assures that prosecutors respect
the will of legislatures. This interest reflects a concern that a defendant not be
subject to punishment greater than that intended by the legislature.41 Where
punishment is not specifically prescribed but left to the discretion of a judge,
the interest in avoiding double punishment ensures that this discretion is
exercised within limits prescribed by the legislature.42 Under the analysis of
Westen and Drubel, avoiding double punishment is an important value. Indeed,
the value is promoted by two rules: the rule against reprosecution for the same
offense after conviction and the rule against multiple punishment for the same
offense at one trial.43 Further, the language of the original Double Jeopardy
37. Westen & Drubel, supra note 25.
38. Id. at 84.
39. Justice Black captured the value of finality in an oft-cited passage:
The constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" was designed to protect an individual
from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an
alleged offense.... The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent
he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (reversing conviction for first degree murder following
conviction for second degree murder).
40. Westen & Drubel, supra note 25, at 105-06. But see Thomas, supra note 24, at 831-32 (contending
that all three values commonly supposed to be advanced by Double Jeopardy Clause may be reduced to
one: "verdict finality").
41. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873) (discharging habeas petitioner sentenced
beyond statutory authorization); see generally, Westen & Drubel, supra note 25, at 107-11.
42. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,718-20 (1969) (holding that prison term served following
conviction later held erroneous plus prison sentence imposed upon successive prosecution may not together
exceed punishment authorized by statute).
43. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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Clause proposed by Madison shows that avoiding double punishment was
prominent in the minds of the Framers. 4
The interest in protecting nullification ensures that prosecutors respect the
will of juries.45 Nullification is the jury's power to acquit against the evidence.
Since juries need not explain their verdicts, it may be difficult to distinguish
an instance of nullification from an ordinary acquittal. To protect the power of
nullification, therefore, reprosecutions following acquittals generally must be
prohibited.4 6 Having failed to convince ajury of the defendant's guilt, prosecu-
tors may not simply impanel a new jury and try again.
But Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, like Twice in Jeopardy,
fails to recognize the distinctly American innovations imparted to the Double
Jeopardy Clause when it was incorporated into the United States Constitution.
Because the work failed to evaluate the Double Jeopardy Clause as an integral
part of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy fails to link the interest in protecting the power of nullifica-
tion to the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in implementing the principle
of popular sovereignty.
Further analysis reveals that the interest in protecting the power of juries
is even more central than Westen and Drubel suggest. Westen and Drubel
associate the interest in protecting nullification with the rule barring reprosecut-
ion after acquittal. This interest, however, is associated not only with that rule,
but also with the rule barring reprosecution after conviction. Where multiple
charges are contained in the indictment, conviction for a lesser offense may
entail an implicit acquittal of the greater offense.47 As with explicit acquittals,
an implicit acquittal may be an instance of nullification or an instance of an
ordinary acquittal. Having failed to convince a jury to convict the defendant
of the greater offense, prosecutors may not try again with a new jury. Even
where the jury convicts on all charges that are presented to it in the indictment,
one may assume that the prosecutor did not bring more serious charges because
he or she predicted that the jury would acquit the defendant of those charges.48
As in the case of explicit acquittals, having obtained a conviction on a lesser
charge and an implicit acquittal on a greater charge, the prosecutors may not
reprosecute the defendant on the greater charge.49
44. The original version of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as proposed by Madison, read, "No person
shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense."
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). See infra text accompanying notes 56-60.
45. See Westen & Drubel, note 25 at 129-30; see generally United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,670-71
(1896) (relying on nullification to reverse conviction following acquittal); Alan W. Schefin, Jury Nullifica-
tion: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972).
46. See supra text accompanying note 34.
47. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (finding defendant convicted of second degree
murder implicitly acquitted of first degree murder).
48. In such circumstances a prosecutor will decline to include the more serious charges for fear of
creating a perception of overreaching and weakening his or her case on the less serious charges.
49. See Green, 355 U.S. 184.
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The structural role of the Double Jeopardy Clause can be understood by
considering the Clause in conjunction with other provisions of the Bill of Rights
and with the Constitution itself. The Bill of Rights contains three amendments
expressly concerned with juries. The Fifth Amendment sets out the requirement
of a grand jury in criminal cases,50 the Sixth guarantees the right to a petit
jury in a criminal trial, 5  and the Seventh requires a jury in certain civil
cases.52 In each case, juries serve the role of "populist protectors, 53 designed
to exert popular local control over the federal government. Consider, for
example, the words of de Tocqueville:
The institution of the jury... places the real direction of society in
the hands of the governed . . .. and not in that of the govern-
ment.... [It] invests the people, or that class of citizens, with the
direction of society. . . . The jury system as it is understood in
America appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a consequence
of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage. They are two
instruments of equal power, which contribute to the supremacy of the
majority.54
Legislatures may proscribe, executives may prosecute, and judges may preside
only to have their statutes, closing statements, and jury charges disregarded by
the peers of the accused. By exercising their power to acquit against the
evidence, twelve angry citizens may be the last check on governmental
authority.
55
Article I of the Constitution and the original language of the Double
Jeopardy Clause further reveal the principle of popular sovereignty underlying
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The power of impeachment, though ostensibly an
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, actually reinforces the principle of
popular sovereignty. The double jeopardy guarantee originally proposed by
James Madison read, "No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeach-
ment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense. ' 56 The phrase
"except in cases of impeachment" did not make it into the final version of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Presumably, however, it was irrelevant. Article I,
Section 3 of the Constitution provides,
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... ").
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by Jury...").
52. U.S.CoNsT. amend. VI ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall otherwise be
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law").
53. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183-85 (1991).
54. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 11, at 282-83 (quoted in id. at 1185).
55. In the Roman Republics, verdicts of acquittal were subject to appeal only before the general
assembly. See Thomas, supra note 24, at 836 n.64 (citing 1 STRAcHAN-DAVIDSON, supra note 27, at 155).
56. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments.... Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
57
Thus, the text of the Constitution provides that office holders convicted by the
Senate remain subject to criminal prosecution for the offenses on which their
impeachment conviction was based.
Before the Senate may try an impeachment, however, the House of Repre-
sentatives must impeach.58 The House of Representatives, through biennial
elections and sheer numbers, is the branch closest to the people. By limiting
the impeachment exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause to circumstances in
which the House of Representatives has acted, the exception respects the
principle of popular sovereignty 9
Considering the Double Jeopardy Clause with other provisions of the Bill
of Rights and as part of the Constitution forces the recognition that the Clause
is more than a modem version of an ancient legal precept. The Double Jeopardy
Clause is also a structural provision implementing the principle of popular
sovereignty.60
III. THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOcTRiNE
As discussed above, Bartkus v. Illinois held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not prohibit prosecution by state authorities of a person who had
been subjected previously to federal prosecution for the same offense.61 Abbate
v. United States,6' a companion case, held the converse: the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not prohibit prosecution by federal authorities of a person who had
been subjected previously to state prosecution for the same offense. Both
decisions rested on the same two grounds. First, the Double Jeopardy Clause
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that "The House of Representatives... shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment").
59. Under the Seventeenth Amendment, the impeachment trial, in addition to the recommendation to
impeach, is directed by a tribunal that is relatively close to the people. See U.S. CONST. amend XVII
(providing for popular election of Senators). Thus, the Seventeenth Amendment strengthens the argument
that the impeachment exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause affirms the principle of popular sovereignty
underlying the Clause.
60. Even if other double jeopardy principles implement versions of the principle of popular sovereignty,
the concept of popular sovereignty implemented by the Double Jeopardy Clause is uniquely American. See
Amar, supra note 12, at 1432 (distinguishing conception of popular sovereignty implemented by Constitution
from earlier notions of popular sovereignty).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
62. 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (permitting federal prosecution for conspiracy to destroy federal property
following state prosecution for conspiracy to destroy property of another).
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did not apply to the states.63 Second, under the dual sovereignty doctrine,
offenses against different sovereigns were not the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes. 64
Before 1969, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states.
Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment made the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the states
in Palko v. Connecticut.15 The Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was not so fundamental as to warrant application to the states. Only in cases
of "acute and shocking" hardship would the Court prohibit double jeopardy by
the states-and then under the rubric of due process.
66
In 1969, Benton v. Maryland67 overturned Palko. The Benton Court termed
the Double Jeopardy Clause "a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage,"
so essential as to require application against the states. 68 After Benton, the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited prosecution by state authorities of a person
who previously had been subjected to state prosecution for the same offense.
Benton eviscerated the first ground of the decisions in Bartkus and Abbate.
After Benton, cases following Bartkus and Abbate could rely only on the dual
sovereignty doctrine. 69 To the history of that doctrine this Note now turns.
A. The History of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
The dual sovereignty doctrine derives from the common law notion that
a crime is an offense against the sovereign. Where an act violates the criminal
prohibitions of both a state and the United States, the act gives rise to two
distinct offenses: one against the state and one against the United States.
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from successive
prosecutions for the same offense, prosecution of offenses against different
sovereigns is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, even where the
offenses are defined by identical statutory language.
The early cases developing the dual sovereignty doctrine were not con-
cerned with successive prosecutions by state and federal authorities. Rather,
they concerned shared state and federal legislative authority to criminalize
certain conduct. In a series of cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the constitutional validity of federal crimes was challenged with the
following argument:
63. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124.
64. Id. at 128-29.
65. 302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937).
66. Id. at 328.
67. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying Double Jeopardy Clause to states).
68. Id. at 794-95.
69. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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1) criminal law had traditionally been the province of the states;
2) competence to criminalize conduct must be exclusive;
3) federal crimes in areas traditionally criminalized by the states
would result in shared state and federal competence;
4) therefore, federal crimes in areas traditionally criminalized by the
states were unconstitutional.
The dual sovereignty doctrine was developed to meet this argnment.71
Criminal competence need not be exclusively the province of state or federal
law. It may be shared, proponents of the doctrine argued. These cases did not
hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause permitted successive prosecution by
separate sovereigns. Rather, the cases merely rejected the idea that the Clause
rendered unconstitutional federal statutes criminalizing conduct traditionally
criminalized by the states.
Early cases rejected challenges to state convictions on the grounds that the
conviction punished conduct over which the Congress had legislative jurisdic-
tion. In these cases, defendants had argued that exposing them to the mere
possibility of a successive prosecution by federal authorities violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Court rejected these arguments.72 In Moore v. Illinois,
the Court wrote,
The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of
[Illinois and the United States].... That either or both may (if they
see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be
truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same
offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for
each of which he is justly punishable. 73
Because a federal prosecution had not, in fact, been brought in Moore, this
statement was dicta. In cases in which the defendant challenged a conviction
on grounds that an earlier prosecution by another sovereign had actually been
brought, the Court upheld the conviction on grounds that the statutes prohibited
different types of behavior and protected different interests. 74 -It was not until
70. See, e.g., infra note 71.
71. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852) (rejecting argument that possibility of
successive prosecution by federal authorities invalidated conviction by state authorities).
72. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (rejecting argument that possibility of successive
prosecution by federal authorities invalidated conviction by state authorities); Crossley v. California, 168
U.S. 640 (1898) (same); Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131 (1889) (same); Moore, 55 U.S. at 13 (same);
see also McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922) (rejecting argument that possibility of successive
prosecution by state authorities invalidated conviction by federal authorities); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371 (1879) (same); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (same).
73. 55 U.S. at 20 (upholding conviction for violation of state fugitive slave law notwithstanding
existence of federal fugitive slave law).
74. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 209 (1893) (upholding federal conviction for conspiracy
to violate injunction against intimidating mine managers into discharging employees following state convic-
tion for conspiracy to intimidate mine managers into discharging employees).
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United States v. Lanza75 that the dual sovereignty doctrine was used to permit
prosecution by one sovereign after prosecution by another. In Lanza, the
Court permitted federal prosecution for violation of the National Prohibition
Act following state prosecution and conviction for violation of state Prohibition
laws. In so holding, the Court relied on the dual sovereignty doctrine:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the
same territory.... Each government, in determining what shall be an
offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty,
not that of the other. It follows that an act denounced as a crime by
both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace
and dignity of both and may be punished by each."
Under this doctrine, proscriptions emanating from different "sovereigns" are
different offenses. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause only prohibits succes-
sive prosecutions for the "same offense," successive prosecutions by different
sovereigns are not barred by the Clause.
The holding in Lanza might seem limited to successive prosecutions for
state and federal offenses prescribed pursuant to the Eighteenth Amendment.
Section 2 of that Amendment provides, "[tihe Congress and the several States
shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 78 The Court in Lanza held that this language confers upon each state
authority to "exercise an independent judgment in selecting and shaping mea-
sures to enforce prohibition."79 It might seem, therefore, that the dual sover-
eignty doctrine was limited to areas of law over which states and Congress
share legislative authority pursuant to constitutional mandate.
Any idea that the dual sovereignty doctrine depended upon the existence
of a constitutional mandate of shared state and federal legislative competence,
however, was repudiated by the Lanza court itself. Following his reference to
the Eighteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Taft wrote, "To regard the [Eigh-
teenth] Amendment as the source of the power of the states to adopt and
enforce prohibition measures is to take a partial and erroneous view of the
matter."80 Chief Justice Taft made clear that the authority of states to legislate
flows not from the Eighteenth but from the Tenth Amendment." As if this
disclaimer were not enough, the dual sovereignty doctrine survived repeal of
the Eighteenth Amendment. This survival removed any remaining possibility
75. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
76. See Pontikes, supra note 10, at706-10 (discussing development ofdual sovereignty doctrine before
Lanza).
77. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
79. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 382.
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that the dual sovereignty doctrine was premised merely upon a constitutional
mandate of concurrent state and federal authority to criminalize certain types
of conduct
82
Ironically, Chief Justice Taft identified the Tenth Amendment as the source
of the dual sovereignty doctrine: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States.... In so doing, Taft ignored the last four words of the Amendment:
"or to the people." 4 Thus, while the Tenth Amendment is the source for the
dual sovereignty doctrine, it reaffirms the principle of popular sovereignty that
the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to implement.
The dual sovereignty doctrine has not been without its critics. Not only has
the constitutionality of the doctrine been questioned by scholars;85 federal and
state authorities have limited the reach of the doctrine via internal policies or
legislation. For example, the dual sovereignty doctrine has been limited some-
what by the Justice Department's "Petite Policy '86 and by various state stat-
utes. 7 The Petite Policy was announced by the Attorney General shortly after
Bartkus, in Petite v. United States.8 Under the policy, the federal government
will not prosecute a defendant who has been previously prosecuted in a state
court for the same conduct unless "compelling interests" support a second
prosecution.89
The Petite Policy is an incomplete limitation on federal prosecution follow-
ing state prosecution, however. The policy is invoked at the government's
discretion. It does not confer upon those prosecuted for state crimes the right
to challenge a subsequent federal prosecution in violation of the policy.9°
Cases in which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded convictions under
the Petite Policy have been disposed of by per curiam order 9 so as to avoid
82. Although the Eighteenth Amendment is not the source of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the context
of Prohibition is important to understanding one of the (often implicit) rationales for the doctrine. This
rationale is reflected in Chief Justice Taft's concern that "[i]f a State were to punish the manufacture,
transportation and sale of intoxicating liquor by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts
of that State to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not make
for respect for the federal statute or for its deterrent effect." Id. at 385. The concern that state courts could
immunize defendants from federal prosecution seems particularly pressing in the context of federal
enforcement of the civil rights laws. As will be discussed below, however, the concern that state courts
might immunize defendants from federal prosecution does not cure the constitutional defects in the dual
sovereignty doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 139-142.
83. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
84. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
85. See supra note 10.
86. See DualProsecution andSuccessive FederalProsecution Policies, in UNTED STATEs ATroRNEY's
MANUAL 9-2.142 (1980) (limiting federal prosecutions following state prosecutions to situations implicating
"compelling interests").
87. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
88. 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
89. Id.
90. See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22,31 (1977) (per curiam) (conditioning defendant's benefit
under the Petite Policy on the government's invocation of that policy).
91. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975), vacating 505 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1974);
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creating any impression of the existence of a "right of criminal defendants to
obtain enforcement of the policy., 92 Furthermore, while the policy limits the
instances of federal prosecutions following state prosecutions, such prosecutions
are brought routinely.
93
Twenty-three states have adopted statutes limiting the dual sovereignty
doctrine.94 However, the limitation effected by these statutes is even less
complete than that effected by the Petite Policy. The Petite Policy limits federal
prosecution of offenses arising out of the same conduct previously subject to
state prosecutions. Thirteen states impose a similar limitation, limiting state
prosecution of offenses arising out of the same conduct previously subject to
federal prosecution. 95 Another seven states limiting the dual sovereignty doc-
trine, however, do so by limiting reprosecution for the same offense-not for
the same conduct.96 As in the case of federal prosecutions following state
prosecutions, state prosecutions following federal prosecutions for offenses
arising from the same conduct are brought routinely.
97
B. The Curious Longevity of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
The incorporation of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights against
the states has led to the demise of doctrines like the dual sovereignty doctrine,
doctrines that allowed cooperating state and federal prosecutors to do what
Ackerson v. United States, 419 U.S. 1099 (1975), vacating 502 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1974); Hayles v. United
States, 419 U.S. 892 (1974), vacating 492 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. United States, 400 U.S.
17, vacating 421 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1970).
92. Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173, 176 (8th Cir. 1979) (denying Double Jeopardy claim premised
on violation of Petite Policy).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d
1014 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Bernhardt,
831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984).
94. ALA. CODE § 15-3-8 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114
(Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1987); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-1-8(c) (Michie 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1947); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1985); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 505.050 (Baldwin 1990); MINN. STAT. § 609.045 (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27
(1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:1-11 (1982); N.Y. CRINI. PROC. LAW
§ 40.10 to 40.30 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25
(Vest 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 111 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1990); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-294 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (West 1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.71
(West 1958).
95. ALA. CODE § 15-3-8 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West
1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1947); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
11-504 (1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.10 to 40.30 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1990); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-294 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (West 1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.71
(West 1958).
96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114 (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1987); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 701-112 (1988); MINN. STAT. § 609.045 (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2C:1-11 (1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 111 (1983).
97. See, e.g., People v. Covelli, 540 N.E.2d 569 (111. 1989), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (IlU. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Trignani, 483 A.2d 862 (Pa. 1984); State v. Caliguri, 664 P.2d 466 (Wash. 1983).
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neither was permitted to do independently. For example, under the "silver
platter doctrine," federal authorities could use evidence seized by state authori-
ties even when the evidence was seized pursuant to procedures that, had they
been performed by federal authorities, would have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment and therefore been suppressed. 9 Wolf v. Colorado99 foreshadowed the
demise of the silver platter doctrine by holding that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Elkins v.
United States,'to the doctrine began to tarnish. Citing "expanding federal
criminal jurisdiction," cooperation between state and federal law enforcement
agencies, 01 and the application of the Fourth Amendment to the states,102
the Court vacated a federal conviction based on evidence illegally obtained by
state authorities. With application of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio,10 3 the Court dropped the doctrine altogether. A similar fate met
arrangements between federal and state governments with respect to the use
of coerced confessions. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,1°4 the Supreme
Court overturned a previous case'05 permitting the federal government to com-
pel testimony possibly incriminating under state law. The incorporation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination ended one sovereign's
use at trial of a confession coerced by another sovereign.106
Given the demise of these concepts, survival of the dual sovereignty
doctrine after application of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states
seems anomalous. 07 The only plausible explanation for the survival of the
doctrine is that the silver platter doctrine (in both its Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment varieties) necessarily involves cooperation between state and federal
authorities, while the dual sovereignty doctrine theoretically does not. Coopera-
tion is always present when one sovereign offers illegally obtained evidence
to another, but it need not be involved in successive prosecutions. In theory,
the dual sovereignty doctrine does not apply when cooperation is so close that
the two authorities must be viewed as a single sovereign.
98. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (reversing federal conviction due to Fourth
Amendment violations by federal officials but allowing consideration on remand of evidence seized by state
officials without inquiry into legality of state seizure); Alan C. Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of
Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WAsH. U. L.Q. 229.
99. 338 U.S. 25 (1945) (applying Fourth Amendment to states via Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
100. 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (vacating federal conviction based on evidence illegally obtained by state
officials).
101. Id. at 211.
102. Id. at 213.
103. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
104. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
105. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1954).
106. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 52.
107. See Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in Federalism,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1544-49 (1967) (arguing that Murphy presages decline of dual sovereignty
doctrine).
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Bartkus itself suggested such an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine:
the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar successive prosecutions where "the state
prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in
essential fact another federal prosecution."'" s Following this suggestion,
several courts have inferred from Bartkus a sham prosecution exception to the
dual sovereignty doctrine. 09 However, it is clear that the exception, if it exists
at all, is "narrow." ' Mere "cooperation between prosecutorial sovereignties"
is not sufficient to meet the sham prosecution exception.' Indeed, despite
extensive state/federal cooperation in Bartkus itself, the Court did not remand
on the question of a sham prosecution. The extensive cooperation catalogued
by the dissent in Bartkus reveals how narrow is the exception.1
The sham prosecution exception is more than narrow, it is illusory. No
double jeopardy claim premised on the sham prosecution exception to the dual
sovereignty doctrine has survived appeal." 3 This is true even under circum-
stances strongly suggesting a sham prosecution. In one case, the exception was
denied where a federal prosecutor was listed as a state witness."4 Incredibly,
in another case, the exception was denied although the deputy state attorney
general was deputized to the Department of Justice as a Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney and given responsibility for the federal prosecution while still on the
state payroll!115 Indeed, some jurisdictions have questioned whether the sham
prosecution exception exists at all.
116
The emptiness of the sham prosecution exception is confirmed by the fact
that cooperation between state and local and federal law enforcement authorities
could scarcely be closer than it is today. In recent years, the level of coopera-
tion between state and federal authorities has increased.117 Particular areas
108. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987) (inferring existence of
sham prosecution exception while rejecting existence of exception in case at bar).
110. United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting sham prosecution
claim).
111. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d at 182.
112. See supra text accompanying note 1.
113. See United States v. Paiz, 905 E2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1990) (sham prosecution claims have
been "uniformly rejected" by 7th Circuit); United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35,38 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
sham prosecution claim); Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Liddy,
542 F.2d 76, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same). An unappealed district court decision has found a sham
prosecution, however. See United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va.) (finding federal prosecu-
tion to be sham and cover for prior unsuccessful state prosecution), request for modification denied, 769
. Supp. 201 (W.D. Va. 1991).
114. United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
115. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d at 181.
116. See United States v. Patterson, 809 F2d 244, 247 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting sham prosecution
claim).
117. Close cooperation between state and federal authorities is not new, as Bartkus itself demonstrates.
In Bartkus the Court upheld the validity of the dual sovereignty doctrine notwithstanding close cooperation
between state and local investigative and prosecutorial authorities. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
164 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting on grounds that federal cooperation with state authorities was so
extensive as to be prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause). Since Bartkus, courts have held that mere
cooperation between state and federal authorities does not prevent application of the dual sovereignty doc-
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of law enforcement have assumed importance as elements of national policy.
The creation of the national "drug czar" and the declaration of a "war on drugs"
symbolize the elevation of narcotics enforcement to the level of national policy.
Technological developments encourage increased cooperation between state and
federal authorities, allowing them to share central databases and forensics
laboratories. Financial constraints also encourage increased cooperation between
state and federal authorities. Local agencies cannot afford to fight massive
narcotics operations or white collar crime scandals without federal resources.
The availability of federal civil and criminal forfeiture provisions 18 and long
mandatory minimum sentences1 9 also increase incentives for state authorities
to cooperate with federal authorities.
Cooperation between state and federal authorities in enforcing narcotics
laws has been particularly close. Even before the creation of a national "drug
czar" and the declaration of "the war on drugs," there was extensive coopera-
tion between state and federal agencies. This cooperation is authorized by
statute. The Controlled Substances Act of 197012 provides that "[tihe Attor-
ney General shall cooperate with local, State, and Federal agencies concerning
traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled
substances.'' To that end, the Attorney General is authorized to
" "arrange for the exchange of information"
* "cooperate in the.., prosecution of cases in the courts of the
United States and before the licensing boards and courts of the
several States"
• "conduct training programs ... for local, State, and Federal
personnel" and
• maintain a central database through which local, state, and federal
authorities can share information122
A 1986 amendment to the Act gave the Attorney General the power to "enter
into contractual agreements with State and local law enforcement agencies to
provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities. ' 3
In addition, under the forfeiture provisions of Title 2 1 ,124 the Attorney
General may transfer forfeited property to "any Federal agency or to any State
or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or
forfeiture of the property."'" This authority is subject only to the conditions
trine. See, e.g., Moore, 822 F.2d at 38; Aleman, 609 F.2d at 309.
118. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 124-27.
119. See, e.g., Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (1988) (providing for imprisonment for
fifteen years to life for possession of firearm by convicted felon).
120. Pub. L 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 873(a) (1981).
122. 21 U.S.C. § 873(a)(I)-(4) (1981).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 873(a)(7) (West Supp. 1991).
124. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
125. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988).
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that the transferred property "has a value that bears a reasonable relation to the
degree of participation of the State or local agency in the law enforcement
effort resulting in the forfeiture."126 The authority is given for the purpose
of "encourag[ing] further cooperation between the recipient State or local
agency and federal law enforcement agencies."127
Federal statutory authority is backed by federal financial resources, much
of which is funneled to the states. President Bush requested $12.7 billion to
fight the "war on drugs" in fiscal 1993.12 In September of 1989, the Bush
Administration's first National Drug Control Strategy "marked a new beginning
in the federal government's war on drugs," a "coordinated, systematic national
response to the problems posed by illicit drugs" in which "more than one in
every four dollars [of the federal budget for drugs]... will go directly to the
states. ,129 Though some of the effort in the "war on drugs" is directed to
treatment, education, and counseling programs, the bulk of the federal effort
is directed to enforcement. The 1985 federal budget allocated $1.2 billion for
the drug law enforcement system, for example, as compared to $253 million
for drug abuse prevention and treatment programs.
1 30
These financial resources have financed cooperative enforcement cam-
paigns. Consider excerpts from a briefing by Attorney General Barr:
Starting early this morning, over 450 federal and state law enforcement
officers started the execution of 38 search warrants and making arrests
against members of the Rodrigues P Street Gang.... A few weeks
ago, I said that because of our tough federal laws we're taking out
violent gangs in one fell swoop. And these cases today are dramatic
illustrations of how federal law enforcement can assist state and local
law enforcement.... And I would like to commend all the organiza-
tions that made these cases possible through their close cooperation.
And they include the United States Park Police; the Drug Enforcement
Administration; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the [Immigration
and Naturalization Service]; the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms]; the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C.;
the New York Police Department in Brooklyn, New York; the Arling-
ton County Police Department; the Alexandria Police Department; and
the coordinated efforts of the United States Attorneys Offices in the
Eastern District of Virginia; in Washington, DC; in the Southern
District of New York; the District of Colorado; and the District
Attorney's Office for Kings County, Brooklyn, New York.
131
126. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3)(A) (1988).
127. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
128. Remarks by President George Bush Prior to News Conference Announcing 1992 National Drug
Control Strategy, Federal News Service, Jan. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library.
129. Michael Levine, The Drug "War": Fight It at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at A15.
130. STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 61
(1990).
131. Press Conference with Attorney General William Barr, Federal News Service, Jan. 31, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library.
[Vol. 102: 281
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
Thus, state and federal law enforcement agencies often function as a unit,
bound together by information, technology, financial incentives, contractual
arrangements, and statutory mandate.
132
It is clear, however, that even such extensive cooperation between federal
and state law enforcement agencies will not lead to the demise of the dual
sovereignty doctrine. So long as courts and commentators see the Double
Jeopardy Clause solely as a device to protect individual rights, successive
prosecutions by different sovereigns will continue.
Calls for the demise of the dual sovereignty doctrine must move beyond
the argument that application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states
renders the doctrine unconstitutional. Courts can easily justify the continued
validity of the doctrine by pointing out that (1) the silver platter doctrine and
related doctrines necessarily entailed cooperation, (2) the dual sovereignty
doctrine theoretically does not, and (3) where state and federal authorities do
cooperate, the sham prosecution exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine
theoretically bars reprosecution. The illusory nature of the sham prosecution
exception and the extensive nature of state and federal cooperation render this
justification hollow but do not threaten the theoretical cogency of the dual
sovereignty doctrine. An additional critique, from a structural perspective, is
needed.
C. Why the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Unconstitutional
When the Double Jeopardy Clause is understood structurally, as implement-
ing the principle of popular sovereignty, the unconstitutionality of the dual
sovereignty doctrine becomes clear. The dual sovereignty doctrine is unconstitu-
tional because it denigrates the principle of popular sovereignty underlying the
Double Jeopardy Clause. An exercise of popular sovereignty is final and
unappealable. Remember the words of James Wilson, "In all governments,
whatever is their form, however they may be constituted, there must be a power
established from which there is no appeal.... The only question is where that
power is lodged?... [lit remains and flourishes with the people., 133 Having
invited the popular will to check its authority, government may not simply
disregard it and try again."3
132. The dual sovereignty doctrine has been held not to apply where the relationship between polities
is not independent and separate but dependent and cooperative. For example, the dual sovereignty doctrine
does not permit successive prosecutions by city and state authorities. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387
(1970). Nor does the doctrine permit successive prosecutions by tribal and federal authorities. See United
States v. wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. WOOD, supra note 22 at 133 (quoting James Wilson).
134. It should be noted that in declaring the dual sovereignty doctrine unconstitutional, this Note does
not threaten concurrent state and federal legislative authority. Although the dual sovereignty doctrine was
originally formulated to justify such concurrent authority, an expanding interpretation of the Commerce
Clause rendered the dual sovereignty doctrine's justification of concurrent state and federal legislative
authority obsolete.
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The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause against successive prosecu-
tions by different sovereigns apply not just to jury trials, but to plea bargains.
Prosecutors and defendants bargain in the shadow of the jury. A prosecutor may
offer a plea agreement because he or she may be uncertain of obtaining a
conviction by a jury on the more serious charges. In such circumstances, a plea
agreement to a lesser charge should carry the same consequences as an implicit
acquittal by a jury on the more serious charge.
135
In addition, the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause against succes-
sive prosecutions by different sovereigns apply to bench trials. In conducting
a bench trial, the judge takes the place of the jury. An acquittal or implicit
acquittal by the judge should not, therefore, be subject to successive prosecution
by a different sovereign. Although a defendant may waive his or her right to
a jury trial,136 a defendant may not waive the applicability of a provision
implementing the principle of popular sovereignty.
It is no defense of the dual sovereignty doctrine to argue that the principle
of popular sovereignty is not denigrated because the second prosecution, like
the first, would be before a jury and, therefore, subject to popular control. In
addition to flouting the requirement that an exercise of popular sovereignty be
unappealable-even to the people-this argument fails to recognize the proce-
dural and strategic opportunities that a second trial presents the prosecution.
For example, having conducted a "dry run," the prosecution has an opportunity
to observe what evidence resonates with the jury. So informed, prosecutors will
attempt to rebut that evidence at the second trial. That is precisely what hap-
pened in Bartkus.137 As another example, prosecutors may take advantage of
jurors' awareness of the defendant's earlier prosecution.
1 38
It is also no defense of the dual sovereignty doctrine to argue that without
the doctrine, state courts may immunize defendants from federal prosecution.
Chief Justice Taft recognized a fear that without the doctrine, "[i]f a State were
to punish [a criminal act] by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to
the courts of that State to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal
prosecution for such acts would not make for respect for the federal statute or
for its deterrent effect" 13 9 This fear is particularly troubling in the context
of federal enforcement of the civil rights laws. This rationale cannot cure the
constitutional defect in the dual sovereignty doctrine, however. Fortunately, the
dual sovereignty doctrine is not needed to assuage Taft's fear. Federal courts
135. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
136. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (permitting waiver of jury trial in federal
criminal court).
137. 359 U.S. 121, 166 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (upholding on dual sovereignty grounds a second trial
for capital murder in Alabama following guilty plea to noncapital murder in Georgia even though jurors
in Alabama trial were aware of defendant's guilty plea in Georgia proceeding).
139. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922).
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have long refused to attach any precedential value to collusive suits."4 There-
fore, state criminal convictions produced at the "stipulation of [the] parties"
need not bar successive prosecution by federal authorities. As the Supreme
Court wrote in Young v. United States,
141
The public interest that a result be reached which promotes a well-
ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceeding. That interest
is entrusted to our consideration and protection as well as to that of
the enforcing officers. Furthermore, our judgments are precedents, and
the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to
the stipulation of parties.'
42
Finally, it is no defense of the dual sovereignty doctrine to argue that the
principle of popular sovereignty is not denigrated because the second prosecu-
tion is before a different sovereign. This argument turns on the notion that,
while the people are sovereign, there are many peoples in a federal republic.
Under this notion, state juries represent the people of the state while federal
juries represent the people of the United States. Successive prosecutions, the
argument continues, do not denigrate the principle of popular sovereignty. On
the contrary, successive prosecutions give each people an opportunity to speak.
Under this argument, if the people are not one but many, successive prosecu-
tions actually vindicate the principle of popular sovereignty. This argument
supposes that a collection of citizens empaneled in a state courthouse is differ-
ent in kind from a collection of citizens empaneled across the street in a federal
courthouse. This supposition is spurious. Under the Constitution, state and
federal trials must be held at comparable locations-in the state in which the
crime occurred.43 State and federal juries must be drawn from the district
in which the crime occurred.'" Finally, neither state nor federal jury selection
processes may systematically exclude members of any cognizable class. 5
Diehard dual sovereigntists might still contend that even though state and
federal juries are drawn at comparable locations from the same populations,
state and federal juries are not identical. The diehards might argue that jurors
empaneled in a state court house will represent the people of the state while
the very same jurors empaneled across the street in a federal court house will
140. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
141. 315 U.S. 257 (1942).
142. Id. at 259.
143. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 3 (providing that "The trial of all crimes ... shall be held in
the state where the said crimes shall have been committed").
144. U.S. Const. amend. VI (providing that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law").
145. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (holding black defendant denied equal protection when
tried before all white jury selected through ostensibly fair jury selection procedures); Strauder v. vest
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding black defendant denied equal protection when tried before all white
jury selected through blatantly unfair jury selection procedures).
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represent the people of the United States. It is not clear, however, why those
jurors would feel compelled to represent different sovereigns. On the contrary,
the drafters of the Sixth Amendment seemed certain that jurors empaneled in
a federal courthouse would represent the people of the state.
In one respect, the diehard dual sovereigntists may be right. Jurors of one
state may represent a different "people" than jurors of another state. If so, the
dual sovereignty doctrine might permit state prosecutions following prosecutions
brought by another state. The Double Jeopardy Clause, even when understood
structurally, does not forbid such prosecutions. Regulation of successive state
prosecutions, therefore, must be left to individual states. As it happens, many
states place some limitations on such prosecutions.1
46
IV. CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause is not simply a procedural safeguard afforded
criminal defendants. The Clause is also a structural provision implementing the
principle of popular sovereignty. Understood as such, the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars federal prosecution of an offense that was the subject of an earlier
state prosecution. Similarly, the Clause bars state prosecution of an offense that
was the subject of an earlier federal prosecution. The dual sovereignty doctrine
may continue to justify state prosecution of an offense that was the subject of
an earlier prosecution by another state, however.
V. POSTSCRIPT: AFTER THE SIMI VALLEY VERDICT
As this Note neared publication, tragedy befell Los Angeles.'47 Four
white officers of the Los Angeles Police Department were charged in state court
for criminal use of excessive force while arresting a black man. The trial was
transferred from Los Angeles to Simi Valley, an area removed from inner-city
Los Angeles and, perhaps, stocked with potential jurors ignorant of the racial
hatred and brutal police practices that charge some urban environments. 4"
A Simi Valley jury acquitted the officers, notwithstanding videotaped evidence
of the beating. Outraged by an apparently lawless verdict, some Los Angeles
residents took to the streets and, through their own lawlessness, compounded
the tragedy. The officers were subsequently indicted in federal court on charges
arising from the same circumstances.
In the face of this tragedy, this Note attacks the very doctrine that permits
federal authorities to reprosecute the Los Angeles Police officers. Given the
depth of the tragedy, it is not enough to explain how this Note vindicates the
146. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
147. See generally Tom Mathews, The Siege of LA., NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 20.
148. See Powell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 232 Cal. App.3d 785 (1991) (directing trial
court to grant defendants' motion for change of venue).
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principle of popular sovereignty underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is
also essential to explain how the Note contributes, in a small way, to a criminal
justice system that is truly just.
While this Note limits its attack to the dual sovereignty doctrine, its
implications are much wider in scope. An appreciation of the principle of
popular sovereignty underlying the Constitution compels reconsideration of
many of the procedural devices that emanate from the Bill of Rights. For
example, a structural understanding of the vicinage and venue provisions of the
Constitution may require reform of the rules governing change of venue. The
vicinage and venue provisions may be understood as implementing the principle
of popular sovereignty by ensuring that the power of a jury be wielded by
people close to the facts and familiar with the context in which the alleged
crime occurred.1 49 Only a jury drawn from a populace knowledgeable of the
circumstances in which the crime occurred can fulfill their role as a popular
check on government authority.
Several jurisdictions are reconsidering the rules governing change of
venue.150 For instance, shortly after the Los Angeles riots, a Florida state
judge ordered the transfer of the trial of a Miami policeman from Orlando to
Tallahassee.151 The judge reasoned that jurors in Tallahassee were more likely
to share characteristics with the citizens of Miami (where the alleged crime
occurred).152 This action is consistent with the analysis of this Note. Under
that analysis, trials should be held before a populace that understands the
context in which the alleged crime occurred. If the courts had adopted the full
implications of this Note, the trial of the Los Angeles officers would not have
been transferred to Simi Valley.
Remembering the structural purposes of the Bill of Rights is an awesome
task, challenging us to rethink many of the procedural devices developed during
the rights revolution. Full-scale reform of these devices will frighten some. Just
as surely, piecemeal reform will frustrate others. The frightened should take
comfort in the fact that full-scale reform reflects both the structure and the faith
of the Constitution.
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (relating to vicinage); U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3 (relating to
venue); Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage (pts. 1 & 2), 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801 (1976), 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1977)
(demonstrating that Sixth Amendment imposes requirement that criminal juries be drawn from locality in
which crime occurred). In the cautionary words of Joseph Story, the power of the jury should not be
entrusted to those "incapable of estimating its worth, or... too inert, or too ignorant, or too imbecile, to
wield its optent armour." JOSEPH STORY, COMM4ENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNiTED STATES
657 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak ed., 1987).
150. See Mark Hansen, Different Jury, Different Verdict?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 56 (describing
proposed legislative reforms of change of venue law pending in New Jersey and California).
151. See Larry Rohter, Trial of a Miami Policeman in Death of Blacks is Moved, N.Y. TIESS, May
7, 1992, at A23.
152. Id.
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